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Recent Posts
- Revisiting free will, in conversation with Robert Picirilli (1)
- Why is God’s knowledge of counterfactuals valuable to a compatibilist doctrine of providence?
- William Lane Craig now affirms universal revelation accessibilism
- When you make a decision, what do you actually change?
- Pope Francis on the nature of Hell
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- Richie on The distinction between Reformed Arminians and Wesleyan Arminians
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- D. Randall on The distinction between Reformed Arminians and Wesleyan Arminians
- Terrance Tiessen on Universally sufficient enabling grace
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Tag Archives: Molinism
Why is God’s knowledge of counterfactuals valuable to a compatibilist doctrine of providence?
Yesterday, I was asked: “how important is it to your theology to add the hypothetical knowledge into the mix, since, in omniscience, isn’t knowledge of all possible things presupposed? That is an excellent question, so I want to post my response here as well. For me, God’s knowledge of counterfactuals, that is, of what free creatures would have done in hypothetical situations (and hence, in possible worlds) is extremely important to compatibilism (i.e., the compatibility … Continue reading
Posted in Divine Knowledge, Providence, Theology Proper
Tagged human freedom, hypothetical knowledge, Molinism
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How would Molinism work without the affirmation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities?
Source incompatibilism A few years ago, I became aware that William Lane Craig no longer affirmed the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), although he continued to work within the framework of Molinism. That prompted me to write a blog post asking: “W. L. Craig’s understanding of freedom: Molinism or monergism?” A few people contributed helpful comments on that post and it is obvious that some others share my interest in this area of theology. Since … Continue reading
Posted in Divine Knowledge, Providence
Tagged human freedom, incompatibilism, libertarian freedom, Molinism, William Lane Craig
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My compatibilist model: a response to some questions
John Johnson wrote a lengthy comment on my post responding to Jerry Walls and my compatibilist proposal. He raises some substantive questions and I think it better to deal with them in another post rather than to reply in a lengthy comment or a number of smaller comments. Because John’s questions are of a sort often raised to positions like mine, I think they deserve careful consideration. 1. If God is meticulously in control, why … Continue reading
Posted in Divine Knowledge, Providence, Theology Proper
Tagged Arminianism, Calvinism, compatibilism, hypothetical knowledge, John Johnson, Molinism, open theism, theodicy
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How can models of salvation be compared on a scale of graciousness?: a response to Jerry Walls
Daniel Sinclair has shared what he learned at the 2015 Rethinking Hell Conference. Since I was not there myself, I read his comments with interest, but I was surprised when my name showed up in his second point. I think that the ideas cited from Walls definitely merit some consideration, and I offer this as a contribution to the discussion of this very important matter. Jerry Walls’s perspective on my model … Continue reading
Calvinist perspectives on Molinism
The Logos Reformed Blog, moderated by Jesse Myers, ran a series of 5 posts by Nathanael P. Taylor regarding Molinism. I was invited to write a response to that series and I did so, in two posts. I chose not to respond to each of Taylor’s posts separately, and I did not critique Taylor’s understanding of Molinism (the philosophical theology originated by Luis de Molina), since I am not an expert in it myself. Rather, … Continue reading
My part of the conversation with Paul Helm regarding the validity of a Calvinist version of middle knowledge
In the Westminster Theological Journal, in the Fall of 2009 (437-54), Paul Helm and I published a conversation which was prompted by my previous article in WTJ (Fall 2007:345-66) in which I had argued that Calvinists should affirm middle knowledge even though they reject Molinism. My conversation with Paul Helm is not available to the public on line, and it would not be right for me to publish Paul Helm’s work, but I want to … Continue reading
God “weakly actualizes” evil
I have been reading a fine paper that Greg Welty presented at the annual ETS meeting in 2013, entitled “Molinist Gun Control: A Flawed Proposal?” In that paper, Welty expands on his earlier (ETS 2010) contention that the Molinist model of divine causation “inherits all of the alleged liabilities” attributed to Calvinism, “with respect to divine authorship of sin, responsibility and blame.” (Interestingly, Welty’s argument may be seen as supporting Roger Olson’s proposal that Molinism … Continue reading
Posted in Providence, Theology Proper
Tagged Arminianism, Calvinism, Greg Welty, hypothetical knowledge, Molinism, Roger Olson, theodicy
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Hypothetical knowledge Calvinism and libertarian freedom
Thus far, I have responded to 5 criticisms leveled against hypothetical knowledge Calvinism in John Laing’s ETS paper in 2013: that it is vulnerable to the grounding objection that Calvinists and Open Theists bring against Molinism that it has an “odd notion of necessity/possibility” that it includes an “odd ontology of personhood” that it “flirts with fatalism,” and that its theodicy is less effective than that of Molinism or Arminianism In this final post of … Continue reading
Posted in Divine Knowledge, Providence, Theology Proper
Tagged Calvinism, compatibilism, divine freedom, human freedom, hypothetical knowledge, John Laing, Molinism, Thomism
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Does hypothetical knowledge Calvinism flirt with fatalism?
Thus far, I have responded to 3 criticisms leveled against hypothetical knowledge Calvinism in John Laing’s ETS paper in 2013: that it is vulnerable to the grounding objection that Calvinists and Open Theists bring against Molinism that it has an “odd notion of necessity/possibility,” and that it includes an “odd ontology of personhood.” In this post, I will consider his concern that what I call “hypothetical knowledge Calvinism” flirts with fatalism (pp. 17-23). Laing observes … Continue reading
Does hypothetical knowledge Calvinism have an odd ontology of personhood?
In an ETS paper in 2013, John Laing critiqued Bruce Ware’s model of providence which is very much like my own “hypothetical knowledge Calvinist” model. In a long post on March 10, I explained why John Laing is wrong to think that hypothetical knowledge Calvinism is vulnerable to the grounding objection that Calvinists and Open Theists bring against Molinism. Next, I responded to his second criticism, that it has an “odd notion of necessity/possibility” (pp. … Continue reading